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1Introduction
The curve in figure 1 represents convictions for theft in Sweden since 
1831 (von Hof er & Tham 1983). What is the social meaning of such a 
curve? What is its sociological significance? To say that crime - 
quantified in one way or another - is a social indicator is not much 
of an answer since the question immediately becomes: What then does it 
indicate?
Figure 1. Convictions for theft in Sweden 1831-1987.
Per 100 000 population 15-64 years. Log. scale.
I will try to distinguish four different meanings of the idea of crime 
as a social indicator, namely, crime as an indicator of
- integration,
- marginalization,
- victimization, and
- stigmatization.
The first refers to the moral unity of a community, the second to the 
level and distribution of material welfare and living conditions, the 
third to the risk of becoming a victim of a crime, and the fourth to 
the reaction of the state against lawbreakers. These four ways of
viewing crime will be discussed in hopes of reaching some tentative 
conclusions about their applicability in social reporting.
Crime as an indicator of integration
The idea of crime as an indicator of the integration or the moral 
state of a nation is not uncommon in political rhetorics and public 
debate. The crime trends in Western countries will be used to charac­
terize the general moral development in our types of societies. Con­
servatives will see the rise in crime as a sign of a welfare system 
that undermines personal responsibility and promotes laziness and apa­
thy; socialists as an expression of the egoistic and exploitative n a ­
ture of capitalism; and Greens as an indicator of the development of a 
large-scale, anonymous society.
The theoretical basis for this perception of crime rates was 
established in the first half of the 19th century. During that period, 
men like Adolphe Quetelet and Andr6-Michael Guerry laid the foundation 
of the tradition of moral statistics. The prime interest of this 
school of thought was not the rate of crime, suicide, drunkeness, di­
vorces, or children born out of wedlock per se. It was instead these 
phenomena as infractions against common rules as indicators of the mo­
ral state of the nations (Jaakkola 1984). The foremost exponent of 
regarding deviance in this way is of course Emile Durkheim. His con­
tribution to the field of social indicators is that he utilized rates 
of rare behavior, such as suicide, as an indicator of a more general 
condition in society, such as the degree of anomie or normlessness 
(Durkheim 1967) .
It is, however, not altogether clear how these early statisti­
cians understood the relationship between the crime rates and the like 
and the morals of the entire population. A certain rate of recorded 
crime in a population can be obtained through different relations be-
3tween the morals of those committing crimes and the morals of the rest 
of the community. Some examples are given in figure 2.
Figure 2. Distribution of morals in populations.
The horizontal axis marks the range from "good" to "bad" citizens, 
where the very bad ones- the criminals - can be found on the extreme 
left (compare Wilkins 1964). Both distribution I and distribution II 
can be said to be properties of a nation and both could yield the same 
average crime rate. However, only number I has a direct bearing on the 
morals of the entire population and it therefore has a greater value 
as a general social indicator. The "bad" ones are just a little worse 
than the "almost bad" ones, and the criminals form the end of a conti­
nuum. In distribution II, the criminals should be seen as a group more 
or less cut off from the general population in a moral sense.
The differences might be easier to see if we insert two addi­
tional distributions which might be regarded as the original distri­
butions at a later stage. In both cases, crime has increased but in 
different ways. In distribution III, the rise was caused by a general 
deterioration of the morals in the population. More people will now 
consider and commit a criminal act. In distribution IV, the rise in 
crime has been obtained by an increase in the number of persons who 
will commit crimes, while at the same time the morals of the great
4majority have remained unchanged. The crime-prone population may also 
have been stable in size but just moved on the horizontal axis 
committing more and more severe crimes. The criminal group is even 
more apart from the general population in terms of morally blameworthy 
acts.
On the whole, the approach of moral statistics has been seen as 
incompatible with modern criminological analysis and it has been aban­
doned by most criminologists (Jaakkola 1984). The moral issue seems to 
disappear when changes in crime rates are explained in terms of social 
and demographic changes. However, the approcah is still alive and I 
would like to point out the particularly fruitful research by the 
Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie. Two examples will suffice to 
show how he uses criminological data to describe other and more gene­
ral conditions in society.
In a historical comparison of rates of imprisonment in the 
Scandinavian countries, Christie tries to interpret the general d e ­
crease in prison populations in all the countries during the later 
part of the 19th century and the much higher level in Finland after 
World War I. He sees the development during the 19th century as a sign 
of deflation of the value of one day in prison. With the improvement 
of living conditions in general, the relative deprivation of being in­
carcerated increases. The prison sentence can therefore be shortened 
without any loss of the relative pain to be inflicted. Consequently, 
the development of the prison population during this period indicates 
that the suffering in the outside society had declined. The high level 
of imprisonment in Finland during the 20th century then reflects an 
inflation in the "penal value" of one day in prison - an inflation 
which was caused first by the civil war and then by Finland's partici­
pation in World War II. The prison sentence had to be accommodated to 
the changes in the level of suffering and general living conditions in 
the outside society (Christie 1968).
In another study, Christie voices concern about the declining 
number of libel cases which are brought to court. A society in which 
the number of libel cases decline is a society in which honour is no 
longer valued, in which an insult need not be settled, and in which 
people can withdraw from further interaction. This pattern applies to 
societies in which people care less about one another, and this is the
5case in modern, anonymous societies. As can be seen from figure 3 
showing the number of convictions for libel in Norway during the half 
century following World War I, the trend at least supports Christie's 
assumption (Christie 1975).
Figure 3. Convictions for libel in Norway 1921-1971.
Per 100 000 population.
A final example of research on crime as a moral indicator will be a 
study of my own. The starting point of the research was the notion of 
crime as an indicator of changes in solidarity in times of war. Two 
contradictory ideas can be found in the literature: the first one 
postulates that war strengthens morals and reduces crime; and the 
other one claims that war leads to demoralization with an accompanying 
increase in crime. A comparison of the Scandinavian countries during 
World War II can perhaps shed some light on the controversy. The coun­
tries are similar in social structure but dissimilar in their ex­
perience of the war - Finland as belligerent, Sweden as neutral (or at 
least non-participant), and Norway and Denmark as occupied (though to 
different degrees) . The different war situations could be interpreted 
in terms of differences in the legitimacy of the political system with 
consequent effects on law-abidingness. Finland with its constitution 
in operation, its enormous sufferings, and its threatened existence 
should be expected to show the lowest crime level during the war. In 
Sweden the legitimacy of the government remained intact, but the pres­
sure from an outside enemy was much less. In Norway the legitimacy of
6the government ceased after the German occupation, and in Denmark it 
broke down finally in 1943 when the government resigned. But it is 
hard to say whether these circumstances should be expected to lead to 
split loyalties and increases in crime in Norway and Denmark or to 
strengthened solidarity with fellow countrymen and decreases in the 
theft rate.
Figure 4. Convictions for crimes of theft in Denmark,
Finland, Norway, and Sweden, 1937-1947. Index.
I
Figure 4 compares persons found guilty of theft in the Scandi­
navian countries (Iceland excluded) during World War II.1 Theft has 
been chosen for the analysis since it is the quantitatively dominating 
crime. Moreover, theft is a relatively one-dimensional type of crime, 
the motive for which - individual (and illicit) economic gain - is 
presumably also valid during times of war.
Theft rose in all four countries up to 1943-44 and the de­
velopment therefore hardly lends any support to the idea that war in­
creases integration. An ad-hoc explanation that "it could have been 
worse" cannot be excluded, of course, but is difficult to test. Nor 
does it seem possible to save the hypothesis about improved morals 
during times of war by referring to the differences in war experience.
The missing data for Denmark 1944-45 are due to the 
dissolution of the police by the occupying forces.
7The theft curves hardly correspond to what could have been predicted 
on the basis of differences in the legitimacy of the existing s y ­
stems.2 A better explanation would be in economic rather than moral 
terms, and consider factors like inflation, decreasing real wages, and 
shortages of goods for private consumption (Jaakkola & Than 1989).
Although it is tempting, caution is advised when using crime 
data as moral indicators. The interpretation of crime data on the 
aggregate level should be checked on the individual level as far as 
possible in order to avoid going astray. For instance, one objection 
to Christie's interpretation of the development of the sentences for 
libel is that libel cases at least in former times primarily reflected 
the maltreatment of household servants. A libel suit would be one of 
few ways possible to take revenge on a master or mistress for unfair 
treatment and therefore not indicate relations between equals 
(Sperlings 1976).
The statements in the literature should also be approached cri­
tically since they are not seldom characterized by a clear ideological 
bias. This is found in the writings on crime and war where the asser­
tion that crime decreases during times of war often also expresses the 
author's general outlook on war. Finally, the relation between the d e ­
viants and the majority must be analysed in depth - both theoretically 
and empirically - before any conclusions can be drawn about crime and 
national integration. I would at least for the moment, not know what 
to say about the development of integration in Sweden on the basis of 
the theft curve.
Crime as an indicator of marginalization
The second way in which crime could be seen as a social indicator is 
as an indicator of marginalization in the sense of material welfare 
and living conditions. On the individual level, this is rather uncon- 
troversial. Punishment is obviously non-welfare, and prison sentences 
for crime definitely mean low level-of-living for incarcerated per­
2 The sharp rise in Finland in 1945 occurs when the war 
is more or less over for the country and can at least 
in part be attributed to the return of the mobilized 
forces to civilian society.
8sons. Numerous studies have also shown that persons sentenced for r e ­
peated traditional crimes live under poor living conditions.
Of greater interest in the context of social indicators, h o w ­
ever, is whether crime varies with general living conditions in such a 
way that crime is a sign of poverty in society. This idea stems from 
the tradition of liberal and radical writers of the last century. 
Friedrich Engels was early to see rising crime in the first part of 
the 19th century as an indicator of the proletarization of the w o r k ­
ing-class (Engels 1971). And writers a hundred years ago predicted 
that crime would decrease or even vanish with increased standards of 
living and improved general education.
Returning to our theft curve, it is quite clear that limited 
periods with dramatically deteriorating living conditions have also 
been marked by sharp increases in property crimes. This is shown by 
the crop failure of 1867-68, by the last years of World War I and, to 
some extent, by World War II. The general decrease in theft during the 
second half of the 19th century also coincides with the gradual 
improvement in general living conditions. The same development can be 
observed in several Western nations for both crime and living 
standards (Zehr 1976).
However, the development of theft in Sweden during the last 
sixty years contradicts the expectations of the earlier radical 
writers. The development of theft probably does reflect improved liv­
ing conditions but in an opposite way. One interpretation of the curve 
is that theft now follows the opportunities to steal. These opportuni­
ties are then a function of the development of goods for private 
consumption and the simultaneous decrease in the control of each 
single object. For instance, it has been shown that the number of car 
thefts follows the number of registered cars (von Hofer & Tham 1989; 
Lenke 1989a) .
A way of salvaging the hypothesis that crime is a sign of po­
verty and the marginalization of certain segments of the population 
would be to turn to the notion of relative rather than absolute 
standards of living. This notion was of course also part of radical 
19th century thinking. Our object of study would then be inequality 
and its relation to the level and development of crime. From this per­
spective the theft curve should be seen as an indicator of inequality
9in modern Sweden. However, the picture of the overall development in 
Sweden during the last decades does not lend support to this hypothe­
sis. Figure 5 shows that the number of persons found guilty of n o n ­
trivial offences has more than doubled between 1950 and 1980 (RStts- 
statistisk ¿rsbok 1988). During the same years, the equalization of 
income has been quite marked when measured through the maximum e q u a ­
lization coefficient as in figure 6 (Aberg, Sel6n & Tham 1987).
The hypothesis that rising crime indicates rising inequality might, 
however, still be saved in some way. The living conditions of small 
minority groups might deteriorate at the same time there is an overall 
tendency toward less inequality in society. The groups might be too 
small, even if they comprise tens or hundreds of thousand, to affect 
the total picture. Therefore, it may be the case that while the g e n e ­
ral standards of living and equality have increased in Sweden during 
the past decades, there are small but increasing groups that are lagg­
ing behind.
Figure 5. Persons sentenced to sanctions registered in the
General Criminal Register in Sweden, 1950-1987.
Per 100 000 population 15- years.
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Figure 6. Development of income equalization in Sweden 1950-1980. 
The maximum equalization coefficient.3
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Some indicators actually support the view that such a develop­
ment has taken place in Sweden. The number of social welfare reci­
pients has not decreased since the 1950s and has even increased during 
the 1980s by as much as fifty percent. Since the end of the 1960s, 
there has been a sharp increase in the number of housing evictions 
(Stenberg 1986). The number of alcohol and narcotics abusers has risen 
dramatically since the end of World War II (even though the situation 
seems relatively stable since the mid-seventies). Furthermore, among 
those sentenced for crime, the increase in the proportion of recidi­
vists seems to be particularly pronounced (von Hofer & Tham 1983).
These groups, which have all increased in size during the post­
war period, are known to have below average living standards. Is there 
a common development in these groups which makes it reasonable to seek 
a common, underlying cause, perhaps a general aspect of the organiza­
tion of Swedish society? I will rather tentatively put forward a pos­
sible answer to this question borrowing an analysis from Staffan 
Marklund and Stefan Svallfors.
Contrary to the beliefs of many people, the Swedish welfare 
state has strong in-built work incentives. The benefits of the welfare 
state are to a high degree tied to working-life. Members of the labour 
force are entitled not only to a salary but to a fairly good compensa­
tion if unable to work because of old age, sickness, work accident,
The Maximum Equalization Coefficient is a measure for 
the percentage of the total income needed to transfer 
from people with incomes above the median to those 
below it to achieve equalized incomes for everyone.
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parental duties, or unemployment as well. However, if an individual 
for some reason is not in the labour force, he or she clearly falls 
behind in term of economic resources- And even if the group outside 
the labour force decreases, the marginalization of those left outside 
becomes more marked (Marklund & Svallfors 1987). Typical of the groups 
discussed here is a large proportion who is not well integrated in the 
labour market. Therefore, the rising crime trend, and in particular 
the rise in recidivism, may reflect a general tendency towards greater 
difficulties for those in the active ages who are not part of the work 
force.
I will now sum up the discussion on crime as an indicator of m a ­
terial welfare. There is a relationship between crime and the general 
level of living, but the direction of the relationship will depend on 
the developmental status of the society. Given the conditional nature 
of this relationship, it might be possible to use crime data in order 
to predict data on crop failures, market imbalances, levels of private 
consumption, and so on, where such data are missing.
The idea that crime varies directly with overall inequality does 
not seem to hold true today. However, a rise in crime and other mea­
sures of deviance might indicate that small segments of the population 
are falling behind in the Western societies. If we look at figure 2 
again, this time regarding the curves as distributions of level-of- 
living in the population, the development from II to IV could illu­
strate the background of rising crime. And if such marginalization is 
a result of properties of the welfare system and of modern, rational 
work life, then crime data become an important indicator of a central 
tendency in our type of society.
C r i m e  as an i n d i c a t o r  o f  v i c t i m i z a t i o n
The third way of interpreting the crime curve would be the most ob­
vious one, that is, regarding it as an indicator of victimization. As 
such, it can be seen as a specific aspect of welfare or level-of-liv- 
ing, namely, as an indicator of "security of life and property". In 
this specific sense, the official crime statistics in Sweden would in­
dicate reduced welfare over time. Theft crimes have multiplied since
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World War II and crimes of violence have been increasing since the 
mid-sixties.
An immediate objection to such an interpretation may be that the 
official crime statistics are only indicators of the changing and d i s ­
cretionary practices of the criminal justice system - an objection 
which then could also be directed against the two previously presented 
interpretations.
However, this objection can be challenged. Most crimes against 
individuals, which are those of primary interest in a level-of-living 
context, are reported to the police by the citizens themselves. They 
are therefore much less subject to police discretion than, say, narco­
tics crimes.
Another way of validating the official statistics, at least when 
it comes to theft, is through statistics complied by the insurance 
companies. Since the proportion of insured households is quite high in 
Sweden, most burglaries and car thefts are also reported to the insur­
ance companies. If minor theft is excluded, the official theft stati­
stics and the insurance statistics coincide quite well. (This corre­
spondence, however, can be problematic in itself. Through their poli­
cies the insurance companies probably to some degree help shape the 
official crime statistics, see Lenke 1989a - a matter, however, which 
I cannot go in more detail into here).
One way of validating the official crime statistics is through 
victim surveys. Such surveys have been carried out by Statistics 
Sweden on a yearly basis since the mid-seventies, as part of their 
general level-of-living studies. Periodically, the questions on crime 
in these surveys are expanded in order to allow for a more thorough 
analysis. Questions on victimization have also been included in the 
level-of-living studies carried out by the Swedish Institute for So­
cial Research. These surveys, which include a panel, were conducted in 
1968, 1974, and 1981 - however, the first survey did not include ques­
tions on victimization.^ Here again, the official t h e f t  statistics 
are supported by the results from the level-of-living surveys con-
4 The questions from these surveys are given in English 
and in German in the appendix.
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ducted by Statistics Sweden as well as by comparisons of the Scandi­
navian countries (Tham 1989) .
If we regard it to be important to have indicators of victimiza­
tion in society, why then bother at all with special victim surveys? 
The official crime statistics exist, in many cases for a long period 
of time, and they cost the researcher nothing to collect. The answer 
to this is that the data from victim surveys offer some advantages. 
One has already been mentioned - that of validating the official crime 
statistics. The surveys have confirmed these statistics to a great d e ­
gree. Another advantage is that they allow an analysis of victimiza­
tion rates in different strata of society. The risk facing single 
mothers, immigrants, and young working-class boys in large cities can 
be compared to the average risk. For instance, the surveys from Stati­
stics Sweden have revealed quite high risks among single mothers of 
becoming a victim of violence (Levnadsffirh&llanden 1978).
Still another use for victim data, if they have been collected 
within a level-of-living survey, is the analysis of their co-variation 
with other welfare problems concerning, for instance, health, employ­
ment, housing, and political resources. The results from the Swedish 
studies indicate that the distribution of the risk of becoming a pro- 
perty-crime victim actually contributes to a reduction of the overall 
inequality in society. The risk is highest in the upper classes - 
which of course is primarily explained by its members having more pro­
perty (Tham 1984).
In spite of these advantages, there is, however, reason to warn 
against an exaggerated faith in victim surveys. I will briefly discuss 
five reservations - the three last ones all dealing with crimes of 
violence. The first reservation concerns the fact that victimization 
is a relatively rare event. Crimes of violence with bodily harm or 
visible marks are reported by one percent of the adult population 
annually. When this number is divided into subcategories, the 
probability of obtaining statistically significant results drops ra­
pidly. This is also true for the possibility of measuring changes over 
time. When it comes to crimes of property, the victimization rate of 
course is higher. If, however, these questions are not limited to 
somewhat more serious crimes, one runs the risk of comparing burgla­
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ries with the loss of a pair of children's gloves at school. There is, 
therefore, a clear limit to the analyses that can be conducted.
The second reservation has to do with the non-response rate 
among certain groups. Marginal groups in society are known to have r e ­
latively high victimization rates. Not seldom do they appear both as 
victims and as perpetrators. The non-response rate in surveys has also 
been shown to be higher for such groups. In the level-of-living s u r ­
veys of the Swedish Institute for Social Research, both social welfare 
recipients and recidivists in crime showed above average non-response 
rates. This introduces a bias in the analysis of the living conditions 
of marginal groups.
The third reservation involves the discrepancy between the offi­
cial statistics and the victim surveys regarding crimes of violence. 
While reported crimes, as mentioned, are increasing, the victim 
studies show a stable level in Sweden. The two series might, however, 
still be compatible. The number of offences reported in the victim 
studies is several times higher then the number reported to the p o ­
lice. Crimes of violence occurring out-of-doors between strangers, 
cases which are usually reported to the police, might very well have 
risen. At the same time, other types of crimes of violence, reported 
primarily in victim surveys might have declined so that a picture of 
an overall stable development emerges from these surveys. In order to 
give a more complete explanation of this discrepancy, it would be n e ­
cessary to co-ordinate official crime statistics and the victim sur­
veys in a better way. They would each have to accomodate the cate­
gories of the other, so as to facilitate comparison.
The fourth reservation concerns the discrepancy between the vic­
tim surveys and the "real" level of crimes of violence. Even though 
more violence is reported in the interview studies than to the police, 
most intra-group violence, including violence in the family, will not 
be reported in standardized interviews (Persson 1976). This is so be­
cause interviewees will feel shame or fear or experience the violence 
as a private matter unrelated to the penal law categories. That the 
dark figure for this source as well here is probably quite large means 
that changes in victimization risks over time could easily be the re­
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suit of changes in reporting, for instance, as a result of an ongoing 
public debate about violence in the family.
The fifth and final reservation concerns the question of threats 
of violence, which were also included in the Swedish surveys. T h e  
problem of reliability is of particular importance here. In follow-up 
interviews after two weeks, a large proportion of interviewees have 
forgotten the serious threats they reported half a month earlier, and 
others report threats which they had not thought of on the first o c c a ­
sion. This issue was omitted from the final analysis in the study of 
the Swedish Institute for Social Research (Tham 1984).
An additional problem concerning the victim studies is the q u e s ­
tion of fear of crime, which is included in the surveys done by Stati­
stics Sweden. Objective and subjective experiences do not always co i n ­
cide. Those who are most likely to express fear of crime in the inter­
views are also those who are least likely to be victimized, that is, 
elderly women. This is not to imply that the fear expressed by the 
elderly should be disregarded. It does, however, become problematic in 
a policy perspective. What should the Ministry of Justice officials 
base their decisions on?
The data on fear of crime also underline the importance of not 
interpreting crime rates mechanically. The harm and fear caused by 
crime depends among other things on the economic compensation from in­
surance policies, on the relation between the victim and the perpetra­
tor, on the degree of isolation of the victim, and on the state of 
general anxiety in society. The crime curve in the diagram is not a 
uni-dimensional indicator of the development of evil.
Crime as an indicator of stigmatization
The fourth manner to regard crime is from the standpoint of stigma­
tization or social reaction. The official rates of crime and convic­
tions are interpreted as the output of the law enforcement and treat­
ment system. The analysis should then try to explain the amount and 
forms of control of marginalized persons which characterize different 
societies. Much of the writings on the subject of control in the mo­
dern Western societies have centered on the question of welfare-state
16
specific forms of control. The description and evaluation of the c o n ­
trol, however, differs markedly.
The ideological overtones are more manifest in this type of a p ­
proach to the study of crime, since the question of the legitimacy of 
the state become crucial. The perspective therefore requires a much 
more thorough discussion - a discussion which, however, cannot be 
undertaken here.
Recommendations
The main problem with using crime as a social indicator is that crime 
is a rare event. If trivial offences are excluded, the number of p e r ­
sons in a year who have experienced crime as a perpetrator or as a 
victim constitutes but a small fraction of the population. It could be 
argued that crime is not relevant as a general social indicator, which 
otherwise should refer to the experiences of a larger number of 
people.
One way of justifying crime as a social indicator is, however, 
that crime rates in fact also have something to say about those who 
have not been found guilty of crime; something about the processes 
underway in the entire population. Such attempts have been discussed 
here under the headings "intergration" and "marginalization". In this 
way the crime rates become more generally relevant, but at the same 
time, the interpretations became more uncertain or even of a specula­
tive nature.
This tension between indicators of great relevance and of high 
validity is probably to some degree unavoidable. In official social 
reporting, it would also be difficult to include indicators based on 
more speculative interpretations. Still, I think it would be valuable 
to include some measure of crime in official social reporting. I will 
end this presentation with some recommendations for specific indi­
cators that could be used, and why. All of the indicators can be 
collected from the official criminal statistics at no cost. The five
17
indicators to be introduced briefly are homicide, assault, burglary, 
robbery, and imprisonment.
Homicide
The validity of the homicide rate can be relatively well established 
by using cause-of-death statistics as a control. The justification for 
bringing homicide into social reporting is primarily that it can be 
compared to other types of unnatural death which generally are of 
great concern to the public. The often exaggerated ideas about the 
risk of death as a result of homicide could be presented along with 
figures on death as a result of traffic accidents, other accidents, 
alcohol related deaths, and suicides.
A ssault
Assault as it appears in the police statistics is probably a poor in­
dicator of the general level and development of criminal violence in 
society. The type of assault which is most threatening to the public - 
outdoor violence between strangers - does carry some validity in the 
police statistics, though (see Lenke 1989b). In order to use the offi­
cial figures here for regular social reporting, the categories of the 
police statistics must be adapted to this type of violence, and victim 
surveys should also be brought in as occasional checks.
Burglary
Burglaries in homes are probably reported to the police to a very high 
degree, both because of their perceived seriousness and because of in­
surance requirements. By limiting the risk of becoming the victim of 
theft to home burglaries, the indicator becomes more robust. And even 
though this makes the measured event relatively rare, it is experi­
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enced by many victims - though by no means all of them as a serious 
threat in a quality-of-life perspective.
Robbery
Robbery is usually committed by persons with low criminal skills, high 
recidivism rates, and severe alcohol and/or narcotics abuse problems. 
The development of robbery might therefore be an important indicator 
of tendencies of marginalization of some segments of the population. 
Both robbery and recidivism have shown very sharp increases since 
World War II in Sweden - development which might indicate a more g e n e ­
ral change in society (von Hofer 1985).
Imprisonment
Data on the number of prison sentences and the average prison popula­
tion are of value whether they reflect the crime level or not. To be 
in prison means to be deprived of many things which are valued in 
life. It is therefore an indicator of (non)welfare for a fraction of 
the population. And even if this fraction is very small, it is not 
negligible in sub-populations such as among blacks in the United 
States.
Prison data can serve as a social indicator in yet another way. 
Imprisonment is in most Western countries the utmost means of control 
that the state uses against its citizens. The detrimental effects of 
imprisonment are well documented. It represents a breakdown in rela­
tions in civil society and a use of force which should be avoided as 
far as possible.
A limitation in the use of prison is therefore an end in itself. 
The criminal policy of a nation is, to quote the former director of 
the Swedish council for crime prevention, Bo Svensson (1988), a part 
of its cultural policy. So why not include the size of the prison po­
pulation in a comparative perspective among the cultural indicators in 
the social reports?
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Q u i s c i o n  135 a 
45 1
2
HAVE YOU DURING THE Pa ST TWELVE MONTHS BEEN THE VICTIM OF THEFT? 
Yes - --- - ----------------- -
N o — — ^Question 136 a 
No c e .............. .
Question 135 b
46
Question 135 c
47
Question 136 a
48
Question 136 b 
49
Question 136 c 
50
Question 137 
51
Question 137 b 
52-56
HOW MANY TIMES? 
Number of times
WAS/WERE THE THEFT(S) REPORTED TO THE POLICE? 
Number of thefts reported to the police 
N o t e ................................................
No is coded as 
zero reports
HAS IT HAPPENED DURING THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS THAT ANYONE HAS 
DAMAGED OR DESTROYED ANY PROPERTY OF YOURS? (WILFUL DAMAGE, NOT 
BY ACCIDENT)
Yes— --------------------
No—  --^Question 137 a
Not e
HOW MANY TIMES? 
Number of times
WAS THE DAMAGE REPORTED TO THE POLICE?
Number of times damage reported to the police
Note .
No is coded 
as zero reports
If the respondent has been the victim of theft according to 
Q 135 and/or damage to property according to Q 136 ask Q 137. 
Otherwise go to Question 138 a_____________________________________
DID THE THEFT/DAMAGE LEAD TO ECONOMIC LOSS NOT COVERED BY INSURANCE 
OR BY OTHER MEANS?
Yes- ......
No-----^Question 138 a
N o t e ...................
APPROXIMATELY HOW MUCH DID YOUR LOSS AMOUNT TO ALTOGETHER? 
Crowns vorth lost through theft and/or damage
( 24 )
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Question 138 a
57
58
59
Yes Ko
1 2
1 2
1 2
Question 138 b 
Yes No
IN THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS, HAVE YOU BEEN EXPOSED TO ANY OF THE 
FOLLOWING?
Violence causing visible marks or injury?
Violence not causing visible marks or injury?
Threat or threats that were dangerous or serious enough to frighten 
you?
If no on all iteics -^Question 139 a
Note .
If yes on any question on violence or threat (according to 138 a) 
DID ANY OF THIS OCCUR
in a dwelling? 
at your workplace?
on a train, bus, subway or train-, bus- or subway station
at a restaurant, dancing hall, people's park or the like
on the street, market, square or other public place
Other place, w hich?.......................................-..............
( 2 0
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IX. SICHERHEIT FUER LESEN UND EIGENTUM
Frage
45
135;
Frage 135b 
46
Frage 135c 
47 1 1 Anzahl Diebstähle, welche der Polizei gemeldet vurden ¡NEIN WIRD MIT
¡0 KODIERT
HATTEN SIE WAHREND DER LETZTEN ZUÖLF MONATE EINEN DIE3STAHL?
Ja
Nein -^■Frage 136a
Bemerkung:
WIEVIELE MALE? 
Anzahl Haie
WURDE DER DIEBSTAHL / WÜRDEN DIE DIEBSTÄHLE DER POLIZEI GEMELDET?
Frage 136a
48
KAM ES WÄHREND DER LETZTEN ZWÖLF MONATE EINMAL VOR, DASS JEMAND IHR 
EIGENTUM BESCHÄDIGT ODER ZERSTÖRT HAT? (Schadenanrichtung, nicht Unglücks- 
fall)
Frage 136b
*5 1 I
Frage 136c
so L_!
Ja-
Nein - ^Frage 137a
Bemerkung:
WIEVIELE MALE? 
Anzahl Male
WURDE DIE BESCHÄDIGUNG DER POLIZEI GEMELDET?
Anzahl Beschädigungen, welche der Polizei gemeldet wurden NEIN WIRD MIT 
0 KODIERT
Bemerkung:
FTage 137a
51
FALLS IP GEMÄSS FRAGE 135 DIEBSTAHL UND/ODER GEMÄSS FRAGE 
136 BESCHÄDIGUNGEN HATTE, WIRD FRAGE 137 GESTELLT. ANDERNFALLS WIRD 
MIT FRAGE 138a FORTGESETZT.
FUEHRTE DER DIEBSTAHL / DIE BESCHÄDIGUNG EINEN FINANZIELLEN VERLUST FUER 
SIE MIT SICH, WELCHER NICHT DURCH VERSICHERUNGEN ODER AUF ANDERE WEISE 
GEDECKT WURDE?
Ja
Nein . Frage 138a
Frage 137b
SU L L
Beoerkung:
WIEVIEL CELD VERLOREN SIE DABEI UNGEFÄHR (INSGESAMT)? 
Kronen Verlust durch Diebstahl und/oder Beschädigung
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Frage 138a
Ja Nein 
57 1 2 
SB 1 2  
55 1 2
Trage 138b 
60 1 2  
61 1 2  
62 1 2  
63 1 2
54
55
1 2 
1 2
Frage 138c
-55—
HAREN SIE WÄHREND DER LETZTEN ZWÖLF HONATEN EINER ODER EINIGEN DER 
FOLGENDEN HANDLUNGEN AUSGESETZT?
Gewalt, welche zu sichtbaren Zeichen oder Körperschaden führte?
Gewalt» welche nicht zu sichtbaren Zeichen oder Verletzung führte
Bedrohung oder Drohungen» die gefährlich waren, oder so ernsthaft, 
dass Sie Angst bekamen?
FALLS HEIN HEI SÄMTLICHEN Frage 139a
Bemerkung:
Falls Ja zu einer Frage über Gewalt oder Bedrohung (in Frage 138a):
PASSIERTE DIES/ETWAS DAVON ...
In Ihrer Wohnung oder einer ändern Wohnung 
An Ihrem Arbeitsplatz
Id  Zug, Buss, der Untergrundbahn, oder an einer ihrer Stationen?
In Restaurant / Wirtshaus, an einer Tanzstelle, in einem Volkspark oder 
an einem anderen Vergnügungsplatz
Auf der Strasse, einem Platz / Harkt oder an einer ändern öffentlichen 
Stelle
An einem ändern Platz, welchem?
WÜRDE DIES / EIN SOLCHES EREIGNIS DER POLIZEI GEMELDET? 
Nein
Eeoerkung: ............................................. « ..
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